In May of 2004 AKRF, Inc., presented their findings from an extensive study of Pier 57 in which they took samples throughout the facility and tested them for asbestos and lead contamination. The study was prepared specifically for the HRPT, who just four months after receiving the completed study supplied the pier as a detention facility for the NYPD. AKRF, Inc., also wrote the initial Environmental Impact Statement for the overall development of the Hudson River Park.

Other documentation, including an inspection report prepared for the HRPT by Arup Consulting Engineers and presented in April of 2004, shows that Pier 57 lacked adequate fire safety mechanisms and had inadequate sanitary conditions. This report, presented to HRPT just five months prior to the NYPD use of Pier 57, repeatedly notes violations of building codes and points out dangerous conditions throughout the facility. Arup has offices at Pier 40, where HRPT’s own offices are located.

The AKRF study identifies asbestos contamination and lead contamination all over Pier 57. Samples were taken throughout the pier, and these samples were tested by EMSL Analytical, Inc., a laboratory accredited for analysis by the New York State Department of Health Laboratory Accreditation Program. A total of 287 samples were tested for asbestos contamination, only 90 of which were reported as “No Asbestos Detected” (NAD) -- although in fact a sample could contain asbestos, but still come back listed “NAD”, as long as the amount of asbestos registered was equal to or less than 1%.

A very basic and abridged list of the contaminated samples sited in the AKRF study looks like this: plasters; floors; tiling; windows; pipe insulation; door frames; duct insulation; spray-applied fire proofing; radiator insulation; wall panels; breeching; flashing; window and door caulking and glazing; and linoleum. In addition, the report notes that plaster ceiling areas may be contaminated as well. It also states that in these ceiling areas, and elsewhere in the facility, the asbestos-containing materials showed damage -- which suggests possible spreading of the contamination.

In summarizing the asbestos contamination at Pier 57, the AKRF report says, “Based upon laboratory analysis of suspect ACMs, floor tiles and associated mastics; spray-applied fireproofing; heater (radiator) insulation; window caulk and glazing; pipe and pipe fitting insulation; duct insulation; transite siding and panels; linoleum; fire door insulation; door frame insulation; door caulk; and roof flashing materials were determined to be ACM.” Notice, this listing is not as comprehensive as that provided by the author above; however, the author’s listing is based upon a more specific citation of the actual table of individual tested samples listed in the study.

Some samples indicated asbestos contamination of plaster walls at the pier as well. The study concluded that additional testing need to be done to determine if only a portion of the plaster walls were contaminated, or if the contamination of these walls was widespread. It also recommended investigation and testing to determine if suspect ACMs might exist beneath the entire roof slab on Pier 57.

The report goes on to state: “Friable [easily broken into small pieces] ACMs in damaged condition, including spray-applied fireproofing, duct insulation, and pipe and pipe fitting insulation, were observed above the hung plaster ceiling on the second floor and in the basement of the headhouse and within pipe chases throughout the pier. Access to these areas must be limited until these materials can be removed.” Additionally, it points out that “[p]laster ceilings in areas that contain firable ACMs should be considered asbestos-contaminated.”

The report also recognizes what it calls “presumed asbestos-containing materials” within the facility. This determination appears based upon, in certain cases, the probability of contamination due to the proximity of other asbestos contamination or to the precise nature of the material itself which is likely to be insulated with asbestos or to contain asbestos-insulated materials; in other cases, the determination appears based more upon caution because of either a lack of knowledge about what might be in the suspect areas or due to lack of access to those materials for testing. Even in these later cases, however, there was often a proximity to other ACMs and damaged friable ACMs.

The study concludes with the following recommendation concerning asbestos contamination: “AKRF recommends removal of all affected ACMs [Asbestos Containing Materials] in the building by a qualified, licensed asbestos abatement contractor prior to commencing the renovation project.” It further notes: “Prior to renovation, demolition, or roof work, additional sampling will be necessary.”

In terms of lead contamination, this too proved to be a significant problem at Pier 57. The AKRF study identified several areas with lead contamination, including (but not limited to): concrete floors and walls; brick walls; wood walls; metal guard rails, piping, window casings, elevator doors, and overhead doors; and concrete stair risers and handrails. These areas were determined to contain toxic levels of lead, based on the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s standard of 1.0 milligram per square centimeter of substrate.

The AKRF study states: “Renovation and demolition activities with the potential to disturb lead paint must be performed in accordance with the applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulation (OSHA 29 CFR 1926.62 -- Lead Exposure in Construction).”

Among the codes used as references for the Arup study were the New York City Building Code and 1993 NFPA 72 - National Fire Protection code. The Arup study states that “…the building’s electrical and life safety systems have code deficiencies, are in poor physical conditions and are in need of replacement.” It goes on to note that most of the wiring is from 1953 and violates current electrical codes. Further, the study says that support and cable spacers for aerial wiring systems may contain hazardous materials. The fire pump itself violates electrical codes, Arup says, and the feeders do not appear fire-rated -- an additional violation of building codes.

The document also states that no heat or smoke detection devices could be located in the pier, nor could they verify any connection to a central station which would notify the fire department in case of fire. “The system…has exceeded its design life,” the study says. It goes on to say “…key components of the existing plumbing and fire protection systems have code deficiencies and/or are in poor condition…” Elsewhere in the fire protection system, Arup says that “[e]ach service is not protected with backflow prevention devices, again in violation of current codes.” These last two sets of comments are contained in portions of the study related to incoming services (water) and plumbing for the fire protection system at the pier.

Finally, with regard to the fire prevention systems, the study concludes that the sprinkler system is insufficient and all sprinkler heads need to be replaced, the whole system needs testing, and any leaks need to be repaired.

In terms of sanitary conditions, the Arup study concluded that “[t]here was oily waste visible throughout the street level of the facility.” This is the level where protestors were incarcerated. In relation to sanitary and storm drainage systems at the pier, Arup states: “The conditions of the existing sanitary piping varies from fair to poor.” It adds: “The existing ejector and sump pumps appear to have exceeded their life expectancy and require replacement.”

The combination of faulty, severed, code-violating electrical wiring and an inadequate and code-violating fire detection/prevention system, as well as multiple examples of oil leaks and standing oil spills across the facility, suggest the possibility of serious danger to anyone inhabiting the pier for any length of time. There is, beyond the fire-hazard aspect, a health-related danger due to the extensive oil leakage. Contamination of diesel fuel, left over from the extended period of time when Pier 57 was leased by the Metro Transit Authority, has been mentioned to this author in conversations with persons involved in additional extensive testing of the pier. Those conversations suggested that there is a significant health risk to anyone directly exposed to this diesel fuel for an extended period of time. However, at this time these other in-depth studies are not available for extensive examination and quotation in this article, for legal reasons.

In relation to asbestos contamination, a section of the Arup study regarding piping insulation throughout most of the building notes that “[m]ost of the insulation is stained, torn, and damaged by water leaks.” It mentions that a few pipes are labeled as “asbestos free”, but most of the piping is unlabeled.

In addition to the evidence of contamination contained in these reports, there were also six hazardous materials signs hanging just outside the detention pens, noting the presence of: Mobil XHP 222 Special diesel oil; antifreeze; 15w-40; TransSynd heavy-duty automatic transmission fluid; and ZEP drying agent. These materials were stored at the pier for many years while the NYC Transit Authority leased Pier 57, and residue from these materials remains at the site. A fire occurred about ten years ago at the pier, and it is very possible that asbestos and/or lead-containing materials were damaged which might have then led to these contaminants mixing into the other chemicals and compounds residue throughout the facility. Pigeon droppings, dirt, and other materials also leaked into the pier due to water runoff that washed these additional contaminants inside the structure.

The Arup report notes that Pier 57 lacks adequate ventilation and exhaust systems. Besides what this means with regard to the contaminants already within the pier, there is also the fact that as many as twenty New York City Department of Corrections buses made repeated trips in and out of the facility during the RNC, exposing everyone inside the pier to diesel exhaust without proper ventilation. This exhaust contains nitrous oxide, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrous dioxide, among other hazardous chemicals.

These studies are relevant not only based upon the literally facts concerning contamination and safety hazards. There is also the question of whether renovations to Pier 57 prior to the RNC might have caused any spreading of contamination, and with regard to asbestos whether there was any possible danger that air quality at the facility might be compromised.

This article is the second in an ongoing investigation into Pier 57 and the Republican National Convention. This author’s first article is available below. A third article is being published simultaneously with this one, and will include links to the first article and this second article. Further articles will be published as the investigations continue.

“2004 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION HOST COMMITTEE ARRANGED TO USE PIER 57”:
dc.indymedia.org/feature/display/109309/index.php
nyc.indymedia.org/feature/display/132549/index.php